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Abstract
While ethnic minorities may ultimately strive for creating their own state,
or joining an ethnic kin state, these options are rarely realistically feasible.
In such conditions, I argue, that dominant ethnic minority representatives
strive to collaborate with the ethnic majority, and pursue liberal political
goals, such as the protection of minority rights and civil liberties, that would
ensure the survival and wellbeing of all ethnic groups. This contrasts with
much of the literature which sees ethnicity as a source of particularistic,
rather than liberal, politics. However, I suggest that when the plausibility of
secession or irredentism increases, ethnic representatives abandon their lib-
eral collaborative aims, and rather seek to end their minority status through
exit. I study these mechanisms on the case of the German minority in in-
terwar Czechoslovakia. Using historical analysis and quantitative content
analysis of parliamentary speeches between 1920 and 1938, I demonstrate
that the political actions of ethnic minority representatives are circumstan-
tial.
Českosl. republika jest tedy výsledkem jednostranné české vůle, obsadila německá území
proti všemu právu násilím zbraní. [The Czechoslovak Republic is an outcome of unilateral
Czech will, it unlawfully occupied German territories through violence.]
– Rudolf Lodgmann von Auen, 1.6.1920
...eine tausendjährige Symbiose der beiden Völker... ein ineinandergewebter bunter Tep-
pich..., wenn man ihn zerschneidet, zugleich auch das kostbare Muster vernichtet. [...a
thousand-year-old symbiosis of the two peoples ... an intertwined colorful carpet, which if
one cuts, one also destroys its precious pattern.]
– Franz Spina, 16.11.1921
Z vůle německého lidu splynuly dva německé státy v jeden... Sudetští Němci nemohou a
nechtějí pominouti tuto velkou dějinnou událost, aby i s tohoto místa nezaslali německému
lidu v nové říši bratrský pozdrav a srdečné blahopřání. [From the will of the German
people, two German states united into one... Sudeten Germans cannot and do not want
to overlook this historical event without sending their brotherly congratulations to the
German people in the new Reich.]
– Karl Hermann Frank, 15.3.1938
Introduction
Czechoslovakia became an independent state on October 28, 1918, in the final days
of World War I. At its birth, the country of the Czechs and Slovaks contained over
three million German speakers, together with a number of other nationalities1. While
celebrated on the streets of Prague, Czechoslovakia was an unwelcome creation for most
of her three million German-speaking citizens, whose loyalties were rather tied to Vienna.
As Lodgmann von Auen, the de facto representative of the German speakers, recalled
at the first meeting of the elected Czechoslovak parliament, Germans were included in
the Czechoslovak state unilaterally.
Czechoslovakia has been widely celebrated as a rare case of a multi-national democracy
in the center of Europe that survived the interwar period (e.g. Cappocia 2007), while
1For political reasons, census data combined Czech and Slovak speakers into a hitherto unknown
category of “Czechoslovak speakers".
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eventually becoming one of the first victims of Nazi aggression. The domestic German-
speaking population played a major role in the demise of the first Czechoslovak Republic.
On the international front, the presence of large, dominantly German-populated areas in
the border regions of Czechoslovakia created an auspicious pretext for Nazi foreign pol-
icy. On the domestic front, the Sudetendeutsche Partei (SdP), a political party for the
defense of the German speaking population of Czechoslovakia, harboring national social-
ist ideology, and secretly receiving funds from the German NSDAP, gained the support
of a large majority of German-speakers2, winning the 1935 elections. Through tactics
of increasing demands, the SdP induced and simultaneously undermined Czechoslovak
attempts at ethnic settlement, ultimately crippling the state, and inviting foreign in-
tervention. Hitler’s diplomacy succeeded in annexing the, so called, Sudetenland to
Germany in September 1938 with the shameful assent of Britain and France, before oc-
cupying all of Bohemia and Moravia six months later. As K.H. Frank, the parliamentary
speaker of the SdP, suggests, Sudeten Germans could thus join their ethnic brethren in
a greater Reich.
These facts lead to the popular sense of the Sudeten Germans as “Nazi traitors” who
destroyed Czechoslovakia. This common understanding, however, rests on the over-
whelming focus on the last years of the first Czechoslovak Republic. Before the rise of
the SdP and the fateful 1935 election, the Sudeten Germans enjoyed a balanced system
of German parties, spanning the political spectrum. The most significant of these parties
participated in Czechoslovak governments between 1926 and 1938. Indeed, the words of
Franz Spina, leader of the Farmer’s Union, and long-time minister of the Czechoslovak
government, describing a “thousand-year symbiosis of the two peoples,” paint a different
picture.
Why and how do ethnic minorities come to cooperate with the majority-dominated
state? What are the political aims they seek? And when does this cooperation break
down? Given their initial reluctance, why did the Sudeten German minority accept to
work within the Czechoslovak state? What were the preferences of the Sudeten German
2For the sake of simplicity, I refer to all German-speakers of the Czech lands as Sudeten Germans
in this text. The name ‘Sudeten’ is, however, somewhat problematic. The German speakers of
Czechoslovakia generally referred to themselves as “Böhmer Deutsche” or Czech German. Sudeten-
land was initially only one of four different dominantly German-speaking areas of Czechoslovakia.
It was only in the 1930s, in the context of rising national tensions, that the name Sudetenland and
Sudeten Deutsche came to represent the German-speaking areas and population as a whole.
3
leaders and ministers? And how did this cooperation collapse? This chapter studies
the political preferences and actions of Sudeten German elites. It seeks to understand
the circumstances under which Sudeten German leaders accepted to cooperate with and
within the Czechoslovak state, what the aims of their cooperation were, and how this
cooperation was undermined. This chapter points to the circumstantial nature of ethnic
minority status. It demonstrates that, inherently, the Sudeten Germans were neither
Nazis, nor democrats. They were primarily an ethnic minority, and as such, they sought
protection of their group.
This chapter argues that when ethnic minorities cannot ensure their group survival
through becoming a majority (gaining independence or joining an ethnic kin state), they
seek the protection of their rights via liberal multi-ethnic arrangements. Under these
conditions, dominant ethnic elites strive for ethnic cooperation, and development of eth-
nically egalitarian policies. This effort is undermined when circumstances present the
possibility of ensuring group survival through other means. This argument is counterin-
tuitive and novel because it suggests that under particular conditions, ethnic minorities
are a source of liberal political preferences. This goes against much of the literature on
ethnic politics which sees ethnicity as primarily a source of particularistic tension and
conflict that naturally detracts from ideological preferences and politics. This argument
also puts the Sudeten German question into a new light. By highlighting the circum-
stantial nature of political preferences, this chapter reconciles the fact that, despite their
initial reluctance to accept Czechoslovakia as their home, the dominant Sudeten German
elites and their supporters who encompassed a majority of the German speakers, strove
for peaceful and egalitarian relations between the ethnic majority and minority, until
the rise of the Third Reich provided them an escape from minority status.
Consequently, this chapter neither rehabilitates nor vilifies the Sudeten Germans. It
is clear that while some of the Sudeten elites were committed Nazis from early on,
others came to national socialism with the rise of Hitler. Some of these men concertedly
undermined the Czechoslovak state, and later served the Third Reich with diligence,
actively participating in its barbaric atrocities. Simultaneously, some Sudeten German
elites dedicated their lives to the fight of Nazism, and strove to protect Czechoslovak
democracy – some of these men were killed by their co-ethnics in Nazi concentration
camps.
This chapter first summarizes the literature on ethnic politics, showing its anti-
ideological expectations. Subsequently, the chapter develops the theoretical argument
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about the circumstantial effect of ethnic status on political preferences. It then turns to
test these propositions on the Czechoslovak case. In the first step, the article reviews
the historiography on Sudeten German party politics, focusing on the developments of
the party system over the 20 year period. In the second step, the chapter turns to quan-
titative analysis of all parliamentary speeches by Sudeten German parliamentarians in
the four democratically elected parliaments of the first republic between 1920 and 1938.
The final section serves as a conclusion.
Ethnicity and Ideology
The literature on ethnic politics has rather limited views on ethnicity and political pref-
erence. It starts from the premise that group identity is important to human beings, and
that groups are naturally focused on their self-interest. The literature consequently finds
that ethnicity produces particularistic, group-centered preferences that either contradict,
or at least avoid, policy-based ideological politics. Furthermore, the group-centeredness
of ethnic politics leads to suboptimal political and social outcomes, as groups seek to
further their self-interest at the expense of others.
In the Weberian tradition, I define ethnic group identity as a “subjectively felt sense of
belonging based on the belief in shared culture and common ancestry" (Wimmer 2008b:
973, see also Horowitz 1985). Ethnicity is thus an affective ascription of meaning, rooted
in common practices, symbolisms, and myths about group origins, leading to an under-
standing of shared fate. Ethnic identity can center around combinations of divergent
traits and social characteristics, be they linguistic, religious, phenotypical, geographic
or other. More recent scholarship, focusing on the malleable, constructed nature of eth-
nic identity, suggests that nonetheless ethnicity tends to be defined by characteristics
that are either impossible (skin color), or difficult (language, religion) to change (Posner
2005). While ethnic identities can be constructed, activated, deactivated, and redrawn
by institutional arrangements or strategizing elites and political entrepreneurs, ethnic
identities tend to change only incrementally, and thus tend to be relatively stable over
time (see Wimmer 2008b: 983, 996).
Scholars agree that group identity is central for human beings. Social-psychological
literature demonstrates that humans tend to form groups “by nothing more than random
assignment of subjects to labels, such as even or odd" (Akrelof and Kranton 2000: 720,
see also Hutnik 1991). Others emphasize individuals’ striving for self-esteem through
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social group comparisons (Tajfel and Turner 1979: 40). This psychological need trans-
lates into the social realm. A strand of identity theorists underlines the role of group
identity in helping find people’s respective and respected place in the changing world
based on “imagined communities” rooted in culture (Gellner 1983), language (Anderson
1991), or memory (Smith 1986). Most recent works on ethnicity see ethnic identity
as an information shortcut, as “perspectives on the world” (Brubaker 2006: 17). Hale
(2008: 35) suggests that ethnic identity serves as information reduction tool because
it is generally “highly perceptible," as well as it tends to “correlate with other highly
important categories" (ibid.: 41). Consequently, ethnicity provides a set of potentially
highly salient cues about unknown individuals or social situations. Given the visibility
of some ethnic markers, such as skin color, language, or accent, ethnicity may provide
more effective information shortcuts than other characteristics, and these shortcuts may
be particularly useful in politics.
Ethnic identity thus creates bonds within groups that are seen as rooted in “primordial
sentiments” (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972), or that are strategically “activated” based on
ethnic demography (e.g. Chandra and Boulet 2012). Ethnicity is, however, not expected
to induce broader ideological preferences. The literature sees ethnicity primarily as a
particularistic attachment contradicting, or at best by-passing, ideological policy-focused
politics. Ethnic preference is expected to translate into group-centered privilege.
Two strands of ethnic politics literature provide two views of how ethnicity functions
in political life, yet both of them come to similar conclusions about the non-ideological
nature of ethnic identity. The first, traditional strand following Herder, sees ethnicity
as innate, and ethnic groups as historically given and separate. This primordial under-
standing of ethnicity inspired some initial works in political science (e.g. Rabushka and
Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1985) that demonstrate how the politicization of ethnic identity
leads to ethnic outbidding – that is, the taking of extreme positions by diverse ethnic
groups. Group preference is equated with exclusive ethnic group particularism, leading
to extremism which corrupts and destabilizes political competition.
More recent works, belonging to a second strand of research on ethnicity and poli-
tics, criticize the primordial approach to ethnic group identity, focusing instead on the
formation and reframing of groups (see Wimmer 2008a, 2008b, Chandra 2012). This,
constructivist view, focuses on the construction, activation, and mobilization of ethnic
identity, which it sees as endogenous to politics. This literature highlights the strategic
nature of ethnicity, which can be harnessed by calculating political elites. Consequently,
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Wilkinson (2004) demonstrates ethnic cleavage manipulation by political elites, while
Laitin (1998) addresses individual strategic responses in identity formation.
Much of the literature on ethnic politics points to generally negative outcomes of eth-
nic politics. Gerring and colleagues (2016: 1) write that “few good things are attributed
to [ethnic] diversity." Ethnicity is expected to destabilize polities, which impedes the de-
velopment of public policies (Easterly and Levine 1997), prevents the effective provision
of public goods (Alesina et al. 1999), and can lead to conflict and civil war (Fearon and
Laitin 1996, 2003, Fearon et al. 2007, Cederman et al. 2015, Wucherpfennig et al 2015).
Consequently, in order to find a remedy to ethnic tension, research has focused on the
study of institutions and institutional contexts that may help mitigate the effects of eth-
nicity. Lijphart (1977) proposes ‘consociational’ arrangements as security mechanisms in
ethnically diverse societies. Fearon and Laitin (1996) study informal group institutions.
Chandra (2005), echoing the constructivist understanding of ethnicity, focuses on insti-
tutional context in the politicization of ethnic identity. Posner (2004, 2005) suggests that
political institutions shape individual identity repertoires and identity choices, which can
be mobilized for the sake of coalition-building. Bochsler and Szocsik (2013) argue that
ethnic government participation can be a moderating factor of ethnic extremism. Zuber
and Szocsik (2015) underline the role of group segmentation as a radicalizing factor.
Given the institutional focus of the literature, the study of the behavioral political
consequences of ethnicity is more limited. It focuses on the role of ethnicity in electoral
behavior, where ethnic identity is described as a stabilizing force. These works find that
since ethnicity provides group bonds, it can lead to the stabilization of political choice.
This choice is, nonetheless, rooted in the particularistic attraction among co-ethnics
“regardless of the platform of the party" (Chandra 2004: 12, see Birnir 2007a 2007b,
Long and Gibson 2015, Csergö and Regelmann 2017). Chandra (2004) demonstrates
how ethnicity leads to electoral politics of ethnic head counting, whereby voters support
their co-ethnics in exchange for patronage, regardless of the ideological characteristics
of the parties. Birnir (2007a: 32) demonstrates how “membership in an ethnic group
functions as a stable but flexible information cue for political choices." Ethnic groups thus
have more information about their ethnic candidates and parties than other, non-ethnic
voters, which stabilizes ethnic vote, and aids in the formation of structured political
competition. Chandra’s (2012) discussion on the theorization of electoral politics from
constructivist perspectives further implicitly underlines the exceptional nature of politics
in the context of ethnic group identities. She states that “[p]arties seek to win votes not
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by defining a correct issue position but by creating coalitions with the right combination
of [ethnic] attributes" (Chandra 2012: 44).
In a similar vein, the study of immigrant minorities dominantly assesses their in-
tegration, political trust, and participation (e.g. Martiniello and Body-Gendrot 2016,
Fennema and Tillie 1999, Isani and Schlipphak 2017, Jacobs et al. 2002, Jacobs et al.
2004, Morales and Giugni 2011). Fewer works, mostly centering on the U.S. and the
U.K., study their political behavior (e.g. Barrera 2007, Hajnal and Lee 2011, Sanders et
al. 2013). This work, often single country in scope, also highlights the role of co-ethnic
attraction. In short, ethnicity in political competition is seen as leading to politics of
belonging rather than to ideological and issue-based politics (Lynch and Crawford 2011:
286-7).
Recent studies of ethnic political behavior critically engage the expectation that ethnic
politics should lead to ethno-nationalist extremism – the expectation of the ‘outbidding’
model developed by the primordialists. These works (Coakley 2008, Mitchell et al. 2009,
Zuber 2012, 2013, Zuber and Szocsik 2015) suggest that institutional and competitive
conditions of party systems can induce ethnic parties to adopt more complex strategies.
Strategic interaction may lead them to moderate their ethno-national or ethno-territorial
demands, potentially reaching out to voters of other ethnic groups, and engaging political
issues other than ethnicity. This engagement of non-ethnic issues is not understood as
stemming from their socially-rooted interests, but rather from tactical calculus seeking
to strengthen their political and electoral position. While this is much in line with the
argument here, this paper further suggests that ideological preferences are (conditionally)
rooted in ethnic minority status.
While this rich literature has identified important dynamics between ethnic identity
and politics, it suffers from two important shortcomings. First, its assumption that
ethnic minority search for support of their group is particularistic, detracting from, or
outright opposed to, the formation of more general ideological preferences is limiting.
Theoretical, as well as empirical accounts suggests that ethnic minorities are interested
in obtaining and maintaining rights (e.g. Kymlicka 1995, Evans and Need 2002). Such
an inclination entails the prospect of broader ideological interests.
The second shortcoming of research on ethnic politics is its frequent selection bias
towards situations in which ethnic group identity is highly salient, ethnic relations are
strained, and inter-ethnic competition is high. While studying these scenarios is neces-
sarily informative, it risks overestimating the conflictual character and consequences of
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ethnic group interactions and ethnic politics. This approach is also group-focused, with
limited study of intra-group variance cross-sectionally and over time.
Theory and Hypotheses
This work takes a theoretical step back, departing from group-centered approaches and
assumptions. It proceeds from the assumption, supported by the theoretical literature
on ethnic minority politics (e.g. Kymlicka 1995: 93), that ethnic groups primarily seek
group preservation and maintenance of group culture. This approach relaxes the frequent
expectation of the literature that ethnic identity leads to self-focused particularism, and
allows us to consider the motivations stemming from ethnic minority status. In this
position, the paper can question the conditions under which groups seek cooperation,
and under which their aims become self-focused and particularistic instead.
This paper argues that ethnic group status, in search of group preservation, may in-
duce ethnic minorities to seek individual and group rights. Ethnic minorities thus come
to support liberal political arrangements, specifically: collective (linguistic, religious
etc.) rights; inclusive conceptions of society which recognize minorities as political and
cultural peers; civil liberties and the rule of law that protect individuals and groups from
abuses of state power. Minority status, by leading ethnic minorities to search for polit-
ical and cultural protection from the majority, infuses politics with broader ideological
content. Such ideological positions, generally regarded as normatively positive, are not
an expected outcome of ethnic politics. However, this liberalizing political aim is likely
to be cross-pressured by a number of conditional factors. The liberalizing ideological
effects of minority status are thus circumstantial.
One of the key variables cross-pressuring the search for liberal rights and freedoms is
the potential for separation or for the joining of an ethnic kin state. Meadwell (1999)
suggests that ethnic minorities seek boundary change, so long as feasibility permits. But
the feasibility of separation or irredentism depends on complex interactions between mi-
norities, domestic majorities, potential ethnic kin states, and other states (e.g. Brubaker
1996, Keating 2009, Siroky and Hale 2017). While minorities may prefer not being in
a minority status, in most cases, this situation is locked in by political practices, by
the standing constitution of the state, and by the international order. Under these cir-
cumstances, ethnic minorities need to seek their survival and reproduction within the
standing structure of the state they are in. However, when domestic and/or international
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developments increase the possibility of separation or irredentism, the strategic calculus
of ethnic minority members and elites is likely to change. When ceasing being a minority
is a feasible option, the search for rights of minorities naturally becomes comparatively
less appealing.
Another important variable is the approach of the dominant or majority group in so-
ciety. When some significant majority elites seek cooperation with the minority group,
it produces incentives for minority de-radicalization. If there is a possibility for polit-
ical alliances over commonly-shared interests between (some sections of) the majority
and the minority, minority elites have incentives to engage with the majority, and such
engagement is likely to have positive, trust-building effects that lead to further coordi-
nation. This is because the majority’s engagement with the minority may provide the
minority with resources (parliamentary support, government participation etc.), which
the minority is likely to seize in search of supporting its rights.
This article consequently hypothesizes that ethnic minorities are inclined to seek lib-
eral3, multi-cultural solutions for their self-preservation, as long as they are ‘stuck’ as
minorities, and while they share some common interests with significant segments of
the majority. Of course, this liberal aim is unlikely to be homogeneously shared by the
minority group, as most groups contain some radical elements. However, when stuck
as minorities and facing some coordinating incentive with a part of the majority, the
dominant section of the minority elite is likely to seek liberal outcomes. Under these
circumstances, the key minority elites seek peaceful and constructive coordination with
the majority. In order to legitimize their self-preservation claims, these minority elites
aim for general multi-ethnic or ethno-blind arrangements that create a fair level playing
field on which all individuals can participate regardless of their ethnic background. This
liberal inclusive approach is likely to be always contested by hardliners in the ethnic (and
in the majority) camp. However, these extreme appeals are unlikely to garner significant
political support while the minority remains in an intransigent minority position. The
3I use the term ‘liberal’ in reference to liberal political thought which focuses on the legal equality of
citizens, their rights and liberties. This term is appropriate from the perspective of contemporary
analysis, but is somewhat historically misleading. In fact, none of the proponents of this approach
in the Sudeten case would consider themselves to be liberals – note that there was no “liberal” party
in Czechoslovakia on either side of the linguistic divide. Also, a number of the political values of
these actors would fall well short of liberal ideals. Nonetheless, I use the term to stress the inclusive,
and rights-focused nature of their aims.
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liberal approach is, however, vulnerable to change in the perceived status of the minority
group. The extent to which the feasibility of escaping their minority position seems re-
alistic, liberal moderates and their aims become sidelined by calls for greater (national)
unity. As the perceived feasibility of such unity becomes more palpable, ethnic extremist
calls gain in prominence and public support.
This argument focuses the preference formation of ethnic minorities constrained to
(semi) permanent minority status, and on how these preferences change when context
shifts. My argument builds on, but departs somewhat from the work of Jenne (2007).
Her theoretical focus is on the interplay between majority repression of and external
support to ethnic minorities, also covering the Sudeten German case. The Sudeten
case, however, underlines two important theoretical points. First, the majority rarely
has a unified approach to the minority, as some actors within the majority may seek
political gains in cooperation with minority actors. Especially when the minority is
politically significant, its engagement may alter domestic political coalitions, becoming
an important strategic consideration for majority actors. During initial repression of
the Sudeten Germans, some actors – particularly around president Masaryk – sought
Sudeten German cooperation. Second, external support to the ethnic minority may or
may not increase its ability to pressure the domestic majority or to escape its minority
status. In the mid-1920s, the Sudeten Germans were effectively supported and implored
by Germany under the leadership of Gustav Stressemann to accept the Czechoslovak
state, engage with its authorities constructively, and enter government. This points
to my argument which stresses the probability of remaining a permanent minority or
ending minority status via secession or irredenta as the key variable in determining the
preferences and behaviour of ethnic minorities and their representatives.
In the Czechoslovak context, we would then expect that Sudeten German coopera-
tion within Czechoslovakia varied in time as a function of the perceived domestic and
international viability of the Czechoslovak state. While Czechoslovakia was a precarious
newborn in the tumultuous aftermath of World War I, Sudeten Germans sought to wrest
their territories from it, and re-join Austria. As the Czechoslovak state became recog-
nized by international actors, and Austria herself, while developing viable political and
economic institutions and processes, dominant actors of the Sudeten Germans moder-
ated their nationalist appeals, and sought cooperation with Czech authorities, political
and economic elites. This led to a period of cooperation which lasted well into the eco-
nomic turmoil of the Great Depression. Only with the rise of Nazism in Germany, and
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the Third Reich’s focus on extra-territorial ethnic Germans, did the Sudeten German
cooperation start to slip. As the calls to the Sudeten Germans to go “heim ins Reich”
[home to the Reich] amplified, were the Sudeten cooperative elites replaced by ethnic
extremists whose rhetoric and actions ultimately enabled irredenta.
From Majority to Minority and Back
The beginnings
When Czechoslovakia is born of the defeated Austro-Hungarian Empire in the chaotic
final days of World War I, most German speakers living in the Czech lands see the new
state as a mere craze of the confused times, which would in the worst case include only
to the dominantly Czech-speaking areas of the Bohemian and Moravian interior. How-
ever, as the Czechoslovak National Committee begins to act as a de facto government in
Prague, German representatives – former Sudeten German members of the Austrian Re-
ichsrat – take a clear irredentist position. They form a provisional assembly of German
Bohemia, and commence with the formation of four disconnected German territorial
units (Gauen) (Crowhurst 2015: 26). The irredentists leadership of the Sudeten Ger-
mans spans the political spectrum, uniting the nationalist Rudolf Lodgman von Auen,
who becomes the governor, with the socialist Josef Seliger, his deputy, proclaiming the
principle of self-determination, and seeking to remain a part of Austria.
Czechoslovaks quickly subdue the German Gauen militarily. Czechoslovak Legion-
naires – Czech defectors from the Austrian army who fought alongside the allies, who
are experienced and loyal to the national cause – establish Czechoslovak authority over
the German-speaking territories by the end of November 1918 (Wiskeman 1938: 82,
Cézar and Černý 1962 I: 105-6, 109). In the context of Czechoslovak occupation, the
leaders of German irredenta leave for Vienna, where they seek support for their cause,
and prepare for the peace conference that will ultimately decide the fate of Sudeten
German territories. Violence erupts when Sudeten Germans are prevented from taking
part in Austrian elections in March 1919, which explicitly manifests their inclusion in
Czechoslovakia (Wiskeman 1938: 84). Over time, however, the attractiveness of German
self-determination is slowly overlaid by routine life concerns (Cézar and Černý 1962 I:
151).
The conference with Austria, leading to the signing of the peace treaty in Saint-
Germain-en-Laye on September 10, 1919, officially recognizes independent Czechoslo-
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vakia, largely following the historical territory of the Czech lands, thus including the
dominantly German-speaking areas. Lodgeman von Auen and the Sudeten German rep-
resentatives are denied a hearing, while some historians point out that the Czechoslovak
minister of foreign affairs, Edvard Beneš, exaggerates the numbers of Czech minorities
in the German-speaking territories (Brugel 1973a: 41, Wiskeman 1938: 88). Czechoslo-
vakia signs a minorities treaty, which is later translated into the country’s constitutional
order, and which guarantees basic rights and freedoms of all ethnic minorities.
Despite mentions of a central European Switzerland by Beneš, Czechoslovakia is
founded on the principle of a national state of the Czechs and Slovaks, and its minorities
are not considered as constituent members (Wiskeman 1938: 94). The Revolutionary
National Assembly – the legislative body of the new state – is made up of Czechs and
Slovaks, and minorities are absent – partly due to the unwillingness of the Sudeten
representatives to legitimate the body (Houžvička 2015: 135). The Assembly moves to
pass the most critical laws – the constitutional and the language laws of 1920 – prior to
general elections which would bring minorities into the legislature. The basic legal con-
tours of Czechoslovakia are thus decided without minority participation. Despite their
opposition to the state, the Sudeten German political elite, pardoned by Czechoslovak
president Masaryk, returns to Czechoslovakia and begins to organize.
The activation of cooperative politics
Between the years 1920 and 1923 the Sudeten political camp forms into clearly de-
fined political parties that crystallize into two strands. The negativists, made up of the
Deutsche Nazionalpartei (German National Party - DNP) led by Lodgman von Auen,
and by the Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei (German National Socialist
Workers’ Party - DNSAP) – the Czechoslovak branch of the national socialist movement
led by Rudolf Jung – remain true to the original demand of Sudeten self-determination,
and reject the Czechoslovak state. However, the events of these three years see the forma-
tion of an alternative, activist political strand, that comes to accept and cooperate with
Czechoslovakia. The activists will come to span the political spectrum, and be made up
of three dominant political parties: the social democratic Deutsche sozialdemokratische
Arbeiterpartei (German Social Democratic Workers’ Party - DSAP), the agrarian Bund
der Landwirte (Agrarian League - BdL), and the Christian Deutsche Christlich-Soziale
Volkspartei (German Christian Social Peoples’ Party - DCSV).
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While the negativists consider the new status quo which relegates Sudeten Germans
to a minority position in a new state a provisional misfortune that must be categorically
opposed, the other parties slowly start to respond to Czechoslovak attempts to engage
with Sudeten representatives. This process is slow and wrought with mutual mistrust.
While the Czechs fear Sudeten irredentism, Sudeten Germans see Czechoslovak state
consolidation as an encroachment on their rights. The fulcrum lies in questions of
language. Under Austria, Czechs were allowed to use their language in official business in
areas where they made up at least 20% of the population, while the official state language
was German. The situation reverses with the creation of Czechoslovakia, whose language
law emulates the Austrian. Sudeten Germans can use German in communication with
the state, and are provided German schooling in areas where they form at least 20% of
the population. The official state language is, however, ‘Czechoslovak’ – a language that
does not exist, but is deemed to be constituted by Czech and Slovak linguistic branches
(Houžvička 2015: 139-40). The replacement of German-speaking officials with Czechs is
of course highly symbolic for both the Czech and the German-speaking population.
After the first democratic elections in Czechoslovakia held in 1920, the five domi-
nant Sudeten German parties enter the Czechoslovak Assembly, and form a German
parliamentary club which through its speaker Lodgman von Auen declares Sudeten aim
at self-determination (Bruegel 1973b: 179). This Sudeten unity, however, slowly dissi-
pates. The SDAP is first courted by the socialist Czechoslovak prime minister Tusar,
while president Masaryk establishes contacts with the BdL leadership and seeks their
involvement in government (Cézar and Černý 1962 I: 192, 244).
Several international and domestic developments determine the formation of the Ger-
man activist camp, and its steadily increasing collaboration with the Czechoslovak gov-
ernment. On the international front, it is primarily the definitive closure of the question
of Czechoslovak state boundaries. While the Saint-Germain peace treaty establishes
Czechoslovakia internationally, it is the bilateral treaty of Lány of December 1921 by
which Austria recognizes the boundaries of Czechoslovakia. Failed coup attempts of the
Habsburg Emperor Charles in Hungary in 1921 further eliminate any hope for the recre-
ation of the old regime (Cesar 1962 I: 264, Benes 1973: 109). Finally, the failed Nazi
putsch of 1923, and the 1925 Locarno treaties normalize relations between the victori-
ous powers and Germany, and greatly weaken the irredentist claims of extra-territorial
Germans (Wiskeman 1938: 131).
On the domestic front, the international events create a sense that the Czechoslovak
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state is here to stay, slowly driving a wedge between the strategies of the negativists,
and the nascent activists. Interestingly, Sudeten German activism is formulated in 1923,
during an economic crisis (Cézar and Černý 1962 I: 303). It is based on political as well
as economic expediency. On the political front, German social democrats and agrarians
start finding common positions together with their Czech counterparts. For the socialists
of both ethnicities, the great political menace is the rise of the inter-ethnic Communist
party, founded in 1921, which threatens their political primacy (Cézar and Černý 1962
I: 257). The BdL shares the Czech agrarian interest in agricultural tariffs, and is more
willing to accept Czech land reform which aids their smallholding voter base (Cézar and
Černý 1962 I: 221, Šebek 2005: 110). The Christian Socials share the Czech Peoples’
Party’s interest in clerical pay (congrue). In the economic sphere, Sudeten German
industrialists are torn between the economic interest of maintaining their supply and
market ties to the Czech interior (Wiskeman 1938: 86), and seeking protection from
more efficient German industries on the one hand, and the national interests of self-
determination on the other (Brugel 1973a: 32). Nonetheless, economic developments
lead German business to cooperate with the Czechoslovak state (Boyer 2012: 131), and
in 1922 the Czech and German industrial chambers merge into one. These developments
lead to the collapse of the German parliamentary club due to divides between the activist
moderates and the negativist extremists (Bruegel 1973b: 179), and by 1923 the activist
parties organize a common working group in parliament (Broklová 1999: 49).
German political aims
The negativists, the DNP and the DSNAP, continue to call for self-determination inside
the Czechoslovak national assembly, and use various tactics to undermine its work. The
situation escalates in 1922 when Alois Baeren, a radical member of the DNP, throws a
‘stink bomb’ at the chairman of the assembly (Cézar and Černý 1962 I: 266-7). This po-
larizes the Sudeten German camp, increasingly discrediting the unconstructive methods
of the negativists.
The activists turn to seeking solutions to the concerns of their constituents through the
institutional framework of the Czechoslovak state. Franz Spina, leader of the BdL, states
in 1922 that “[i]t is now a question of fighting, realistically and shrewdly, not against
the State but for our rights in the State” (cited in Brugel 1973a: 71). In 1926 Franz
Spina of the BdL, and Robert Mayr-Harting, leader of the DCSV, enter the Czechoslovak
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government as ministers. From this date until 1938, all Czechoslovak governments have
at least two ministers from the German activist camp. The key aims of activist parties
rest on preserving the key interests of the Sudeten German ethnic group. They can be
broadly divided into four areas: constitutional rights, civil liberties, linguistic rights,
and social matters.
The key concern for the activists is the constitutional position of their group in the
new state. It is particularly difficult given that they went from being the dominant
ethnic group of Austria to being a minority in a new political entity. Activist leaders
lament the loss of rights not simply in practical terms, such as access to services or jobs
in their language, but also in symbolic terms. They call for recognition of their group
as a group equal to the Czechs and Slovaks, as having inherent rights to participate in
the formation of the state and society.
The sincerity of this aim is difficult to evaluate. Is it a genuine call for equality, or
is it a thinly veiled harking back to being the dominant ethnicity of Austria, as some
historians suggest (e.g. Broklová 1998, 1999)? Indeed, a number of negativists also call
for “true democracy” in Czechoslovakia, which is difficult to accept from the mouths of
national socialist parliamentarians (e.g. Knirsch, 3.12.1920). The distinction between
the negativist and the activist calls for rights, however, lies in their context. Negativist
calls for rights tend to quickly slip into threats. In his speech, Hans Knirsch (DNSAP,
3.12.1920) suggests that the Germans are “waiting for the sign of [Czech] goodwill...
otherwise [they] will arrange themselves accordingly.” On the other hand, activist calls
are increasingly associated with expressions of loyalty to the state, so long as it provides
a respectful home for its minorities – something absent in negativist discourse. In the
case of the activist ministers, these statements are further backed by more concrete deeds
as well. Mayr-Harting sums up the activist position in an early statement entitled “The
First Step:”
The Germans want to be loyal citizens of this state, but only at the price
of recognition of our nationality as equal within the state. As equals among
equals, they request political, national and cultural self-administration. As
domiciled citizens on land they have long since held, they request full political
freedom in their historical areas of inhabitancy. And with this, everything
has been said. (cited in Broklová 1998: 189)
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The activist calls for recognition of equal rights4, and the recreation of Czechoslovakia
into a state of nations, rather than a nation state, effectively elevate the central im-
portance of group rights. Although traditionally not a part of a liberal understanding
of rights, the concept of group rights has been theorized as central to group preser-
vation, and effective inter-ethnic cohabitation (Kymlicka 1995). As early as 1921, the
Association of German Lawyers writes to the Czechoslovak government calling for the
“legal guarantee of linguistic equality of all nations” of Czechoslovakia5. The ultimate
goal of the group’s symbolic recognition is to allow the Sudeten Germans their sense
of participation in the state. The words of Spina “This is our state too”, underline the
double-sided character of responsibilities and rights that come with this participation
(cited in Brugel 1973a: 85).
As a minority in a state dominated by the Czechs and Slovaks, the Sudeten Germans
fear the potential repressive capacity of the state. When the minister of finance, Alois
Rašín, is assassinated by a Czech anarchist in 1923, the national assembly passes a
Defense of the Republic Law, which provides strict punishment for treason, conspiracy, or
violent attacks against the republic. While not atypical, this step is seen as a concerning
limitation of civil liberties by the German minority, which some see as an act of Czech
national chauvinists (Šebek 2005: 92). Similarly, while the BdL comes to accept the
Czechoslovak state, the party expresses concerns about the control of the repressive
state apparatus (Kubů and Šouša 2012: 152). Ludwig Czech, leader of the socialist
DSAP, speaks about the creation of “first and second class citizens... aimed against the
proletariate and national minorities in this state...” (6.3.1923).
The most crucial aim of the German activists is the language question, which stands
at the core of cultural reproduction of the group, as well as the economic fortunes of
its members. The original language law of 1920, passed by the revolutionary assembly
without the presence of ethnic minorities, entrenches the 20% minority language rule
discussed above. The unresolved questions are the construction of Czech schools in
dominantly German-speaking areas, and the use of minority languages in civil service.
The latter is defined by an executive order of 1926, which passes without a parliamentary
debate. The order angers all German parties because it restricts the use of minority
languages even in lower civil service posts, and requires non-Czech employees to pass
4Spina refers to “die Anerkennung der nationalen Gleichberechtigung” (cited in Kubů and Šouša 2012:
162).
5“...eine sprachliche Gleichberechtigung aller Nationen verbürgendes Gesetz" in Kučera (1999: 71).
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Czech language tests within six months (Šebek 2005: 206, see also Kučera 1999).
The activists, however, work towards improvement. After the entry into government,
Mayr-Harting recalls significant improvements in language law, in the maintenance of
civil service posts for German-speakers, and maintenance of German schools (in Broklová
1999: 89). This work leads to a new language order of 1928 which increases the use of
German (Wiskeman 1938: 133). Franz Spina, a professor of Czech linguistics (Höhne
2012), works to improve the situation of German schools, and seeks the creation of
a particular administrative schooling bureau for every ethnic group in Czechoslovakia.
The socialist Wenzel Jaksch (1964: 248), recalls the fruitfulness of German government
participation which led to a “flourishing school system, and a network of efficient local
governments which provided many social services for the people of cities, districts, and
industrial settlements.”
Social affairs are another important area of interest of the German activists. The
importance of this policy area increases dramatically after the 1929 Great Depression,
which hits Czechoslovakia with full force in the early 1930s. Coincidentally, Ludwig
Czech becomes the new minister of social affairs after the 1929 parliamentary elections.
The response to the social disaster of the next years thus lies on his shoulders. As
unemployment rises, Czech orders the multiplication of the statutory social assistance
period, as well as the subsidy. This, according to preceding legislation, covers only
unionized labor, leaving many without social assistance. Czech thus arranges a special
aid scheme which is payed out “strictly in accordance with the numbers of unemployed
registered locally” (Bruegel 1973: 83). Brügel suggests that Czech’s policies set a certain
standard, and are continued by subsequent ministers (ibid.: 84). Czech’s focus on the
social character of the challenge he faces, rather than its distribution across different
groups, as well as his insistence on ‘strict numbers,’ amount to a pragmatic policy of
ethnic blindness. This enables him to support those in need, naturally favoring the
economically harder-hit German-speaking areas.
Despite the good will of German activists, their achievements in terms of concrete
policy outcomes that would improve the ethno-linguistic position of the Sudeten pop-
ulation are limited. This is partly because, as Sobieraj (2002: 3) suggests, they are
not sufficiently strategic in drawing concessions from the Czech majority, and partly
because the Czechs simply are not ready to compromise on ethno-linguistic issues until
very late (see Kučera 1999). Fundamentally, activist work is most successful in areas
that are explicitly not ethnic. Cooperation flourishes in the context of deeper economic
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competition in the political system (see Boyer 2012), in which Czech and German par-
ties of the same ideological colour naturally converge. The activists are aware of this,
as Franz Spina juxtaposes what he calls ’class parties’ (Ständeparteien) with ’world-
view parties’ (Weltanschaungparteien), emphasizing that he cares about the economy
and farming prior to worldview (Sobieraj 2002: 160). Activists thus stress that regular
economic cooperation in a common state brings rights, justice and equality to all those
who participate (Böllman in Sobieraj 2002: 170).
The Great Depression and the rise of Nazism
Despite Czech’s efforts, the economic crisis is deep, and long. Since it hits German-
speaking areas, involved in lighter, export-oriented industries hard-hit by falling inter-
national demand, harder, it fuels ethnic tensions in Czechoslovakia. This translates into
the slow rise in popularity of the Sudeten German national socialist DNSAP. It is im-
possible to separate the rise of Nazism – among both the Sudeten Germans, and their
neighbors in Germany – from the dire economic and social situation of the early 1930s.
Whether the Sudeten Germans would increasingly turn to the DNSAP in the absence of
Hitler’s success on the other side of the border, whether they would turn to the DNSAP
without an economic crisis, are unanswerable questions. What can be said, however, is
that the Great Depression does not lead to the collapse of Sudeten German democratic,
activist politics. Contrary to popular view that the Great Depression precipitates a
uniform downfall of democratic forces, Cézar and Černý (1962 II: 81-82) suggest that it
rather produces a polarization in the Sudeten German camp. Local elections in 1931 – in
the depth of the Great Depression – show an increased support of the DNSAP, but also
of the socialist, activist DSAP. Indeed, the Great Depression sees the activist parties seek
greater collaboration with their Czech ideological counterparts in their responses to the
economic and social situation. The Agrarians, for example, cooperate on tariff protec-
tion (Lidové Noviny 25.3.1930), while the Socialists of both nationalities hold common
party conferences, support each other in government negotiations, and largely follow
shared goals and strategy (Lidové Noviny 28.9.1930, 21.1.1931, 19.2.1931, 14.9.1932). In
fact, the Great Depression further focuses activist politics on pragmatic daily cooper-
ation within the government, no longer calling for some overt accommodative moment
between the national groups (Peroutka, Lidové Noviny 8.3.1931).
The demarcation between activism and negativism hardens (Wiskeman 1938: 198).
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On the one hand, the national socialist DNSAP becomes the dominant negativist force,
eclipsing the once-dominant DNP. Inside the DNSAP, factions more closely aligned with
Hitler – particularly Hans Krebs – overshadow the party leader, Rudof Jung, an adver-
sary of Hitler’s who sees himself as the rightful leader of the national socialist movement
(Cézar and Černý 1962 II: 186,188). The Sudeten German negativist camp is thus in-
creasingly aligned with the policies and aims of the German NSDAP. On the other hand,
as the NSDAP ascends to power in Germany between 1932 and 1933, the activists be-
come increasingly alarmed by Nazi policies. This in fact solidifies the democratic resolve
of the activist camp, and their will to cooperate with the Czechs. Spina declares that
“[t]he storm which rages around our frontiers compels the nations of this State to draw
together as equals among equals” (cited in Bruegel 1973: 107). Jaksch rejects negativist
calls for Sudeten autonomy by stating that “we don’t want cultural autonomy for Nazi
teachers to do what they like in the schools” (cited in Bruegel 1973: 148).
The rise of Nazism in Germany and its close connections with the Sudeten nega-
tivist camp naturally concern Czechoslovak authorities. Mounting evidence suggests
that leaders of the DNSAP coordinate with the German NSDAP. The first political
process against national socialism sentences members of the DNSAP-linked sport asso-
ciation Volkssport for organizing Nazi storm troops under a sporting guise (Crowhurst
2015: 89). DNSAP leaders lose their parliamentary immunity in a vote supported by
Sudeten German activists (Cézar and Černý 1962 II: 137), and both negativist parties
– the DNSAP and the DNP – are banned in the fall of 1933. However, in anticipa-
tion of the ban, the negativist camp prepares the formation of a new party with a new
organizational base which would not be compromised by obvious association with the
DNSAP. The leader of the new formation, Konrad Henlein, an unknown gymnastics
teacher, discusses the formation of a Sudeten German front with Hans Krebs (Cézar
and Černý 1962 II: 196). The new Sudeten Heimatsfront is rooted in populist claims of
overcoming Sudeten partisanship for the sake of national unity. In order to avoid the fate
of the DNSAP, Henlein combines the calls for Sudeten national unity with democratic
slogans and conciliatory gestures towards Czechoslovakia (ibid.: 220-1). Nonetheless,
entire local organization of the now-defunct DNP and DNSAP join the movement. A
new negativist force is born.
The period between 1933 and 1935 is critical. While the economic situation is slowly
improving, the political situation in the German camp is shifting. The Heimatsfront is
making political headway among the German-speaking population, and activist parties
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feel an increasing need to respond. In October 1933, a BdL leader, Zierhut, engages the
rise of Henlein when he speaks of “irresponsible politicians and parties that make the
Sudeten population look like a danger to the state," stressing that “only in a democracy
can the Sudeten Germans gain equality" (Lidové Noviny 7.10.1933). By 1934, a time
when Hitler is consolidating his power in Germany, the BdL as well as the DCSV are
torn about their approach to Henlein, with some, particularly younger, leaders interested
in electoral cooperation with the Heimatsfront (Lidové Noviny 1.6.1934). Ludwig Czech
criticizes the Heimatsfront, calling for “national pacification" rather than the building
of “national fronts" (Lidové Noviny 26.3.1935). Shortly prior to the 1935 parliamentary
elections, the BdL attempts to coordinate with Henlein, hoping to limit Heimatsfront’s
agitation among its traditional rural voters (Lidové Noviny 24.1.1935). A Czech journal-
ist summarizes the situation when stating that it is hard for the activists to defend their
positions at “a time when the pan-Germanic myth is again burning bright" (Peroutka,
Lidové Noviny, 4.3.1935).
The ultimate turning point in Sudeten German politics comes with the 1935 parlia-
mentary elections (see figure 1). These elections are held on May 19, 1935, less than two
months after the Saar plebiscite decided to reunify the Saarland with Germany. This
is the first demonstration of the possibility of bringing extra-territorial Germans into
the increasingly confident German Third Reich. Konrad Henlein, who does not person-
ally stand for election, transforms the Heimatsfront into a fully fledged Sudetendeutsche
Partei (Sudeten German Party - SdP), which he leads to a stunning electoral victory.
The SdP receives over 1.2 million votes, and becomes the largest party in the Czechoslo-
vak assembly – larger than any Czech or Slovak party. Henlein characterizes the elections
as “the Saar plebiscite, as a plebiscite about [Sudeten] belonging to this state or to Ger-
many” (cited in Broklová 1999:58). Ludwig Czech speaks of a victory for Hitler (Cézar
and Černý 1962 II: 294).
The 1935 election deals a blow to the activist camp, as it loses many seats in the assem-
bly, and, more importantly, as the tide of German public opinion shifts. Nonetheless, the
three activist parties – DSAP, BdL and DCSV – turn to coordinate their response to the
SdP in the form of so-called neo-activism. While Ludwig Czech and Franz Spina retain
their ministerial positions, they are replaced as dominant party members by younger
men – Wenzel Jaksch and Gustav Hacker. In the DCSV, it is Hans Schütz and Erwin
Zajíček. It is this new generation that tries to stem the youthful appeal of the SdP,
and comes to represent the neo-activist stream of the mid-late 1930s. Neo-activism is a
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Figure 1: Electoral results of Sudeten German parties
response to the palpable threat to democracy posed by Nazism in Germany and the SdP
at home. As Hitler’s repression against German socialists, Catholics, Jews and others
escalates, political refugees arriving in Bohemia bring the urgent reality to the Sudeten
activist doorstep (Wiskeman 1938: 198). Neo-activism thus on the one hand tries to
pragmatically cooperate with the Czechs in order to secure visible minority rights gains
and stem the rise of the SdP. It no longer calls for Sudeten autonomy, which in light of
SdP dominance is seen as dangerous to democracy even by the Sudeten activists (Šebek
2005: 279). On the other hand, neo-activism is activism in the context of heightened
ethnic tensions. The neo-activists need to demonstrate their ethnic loyalties, and thus
neo-activism is infused with populist references. It is particularly the socialist Wenzel
Jaksch, who formulates the concept of ‘Volkssozialismus’ which rejects marxism and
turns towards the middle classes, trying to wrest them away from the SdP. It, however,
includes nationalist undertones that somewhat align it with Henlein (Cézar and Černý
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1962 II: 273). Ultimately, the neo-activists are open to cooperation with the SdP (Šebek
2005: 331), which leads them down a slippery slope.
The neo-activists are successful in securing attention of the Czechoslovak government,
which is increasingly distressed by the SdP. In February 1937 prime minister Hodža and
the neo-activsits agree on an ethnic settlement. The government promises to increase
funding for German-speaking areas, to proportionally represent minorities in the civil
service and thus to increase the number of employed German-speakers, to provide public
tenders to Sudeten German companies, and to increase minority cultural funding (Cézar
and Černý 1962 II: 394). However, while the activists are satisfied, Henlien’s aims lie
outside the realm of Czechoslovak law. Henlien unveils his strategy to Hitler in Berlin,
saying: “We must always demand so much that we can never be satisfied” (cited in
Benes 1973: 158). Henlein immediately escalates his demands, calling the government
proposal insufficient, and asking for Sudeten German self-rule (Cézar and Černý 1962
II: 281). In the pre-1935 context, the government proposal would have been heeded as
a major activist victory, however, in the context of Henlein’s ethnic outbidding, even
major gains by the activists become viewed as insignificant.
The ultimate collapse comes when the possibility of exit from minority status fills the
headlines. In February 1938 Hitler demands that Germany ‘liberate’ 10 million Germans
outside her borders (Cézar and Černý 1962 II: 414). One month later, the Anschluss
of Austria ends all activist hopes, and heralds the end of Czechoslovakia. Activist pol-
itics collapse over night, as most members of activist parties conclude that the fate of
Czechoslovakia will lie outside her powers. Franz Spina resigns and leaves politics, while
his BdL joins the SdP. Robert Mayr-Harting joins the SdP, but then also resigns. The
SdP thus becomes the sole right-wing Sudeten party, with only the weakened social-
ist DSAP remaining outside (Cézar and Černý 1962 II: 442-6). Henlein escalates his
demands, the Czechoslovak government concedes, only to be faced with additional re-
quests. The Sudeten question is settled by the Munich Agreement of September 1938
where Britain, France, Germany and Italy decide the fate of a country not even present
at the talks. Areas with more than 50% German-speakers are ceded to the German
Reich. In March 1939 German armies occupy the remaining parts of the Czech lands.
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Analyzing Parliamentary Speeches of Sudeten Representatives
This section turns to analyze the discursive behavior of Sudeten German elites in order
to assess the extent to which the changing context of ethnic minority status affected
their stated positions and aims. The first analysis focuses on 399 speeches by the leading
proponents of Sudeten German political life – the leadership and parliamentary speakers
of all Sudeten parliamentary parties. The analyzed parliamentarians are listed in table
1.
Given the theoretical propositions, and the historical context of the Sudeten Germans
in Czechoslovakia in the 1920s and 30s, I expect that in the early years of the country,
ethno-nationalist discurse dominates among both political streams – the negativists and
those who eventually become active collaborators with the Czechoslovak regime. As
Czechoslovakia gains international recognition and becomes a viable state, I expect that
the activist stream gradually reduces its ethno-national discourse, while that of the
negativists remains steadily high. This should persist until the rise of Nazism in Germany
slowly increases the potential of Sudeten irredenta. Ethno-national discourse should
incrementally return to the speeches of Sudeten activists particularly after 1935, and
should eventually reunite the activists and the negativists by 1938. Figure 2 summarizes
these expectations.
The textual analysis uses the R package quanteda (Benoit et al.). In order to assess
the varying presence of ethno-national discourse in parliamentary speeches over time,
I define three dictionaries. The first one contains words that refer to ethnic identi-
fiers such as ‘nation’, ‘language’, ‘Czech’, ‘German’, ‘Sudeten’, ‘minority’. The second
one contains economic identifiers, such as ‘employee’, ‘worker’, ‘proletarian’, ‘capitalist’,
‘bourgeois’, ‘farmer’, ‘small owner’. The third contains references to the economy, such
as ‘employment’, ‘wage’, ‘tariff’, ‘finance’, ‘subsidy’, ‘finance’, ‘crisis’, ‘tax’, ‘market’,
‘economy’, ‘production’, ‘monopoly’. As all the parliamentary speeches are in Czech, I
define these dictionaries in Czech, providing a summary in table 2.
The first analysis addresses the discourses of the activists and negativists, by compar-
ing the proportion of words contained in these dictionaries in the parliamentary speeches.
The analysis simply counts the share of each set of words over the total number of words
in the speech. The results are presented graphically.
Figure 3 demonstrates the expected trend in references to ethnic group identity over
the 18 years of democratic parliamentary life in the first Czechoslovak Republic. While at
24
First Name Last Name Party Position
Josef Bohr DCSV Parliam Club Speaker
Georg Böllmann BdL Parliam Club Speaker
Heinrich Brunar DNP Leader
Ludwig Czech DSAP Leader
Eugen de Witte DSAP Parliam Club Speaker
Karl Hermann Frank SdP Dominant member
Wenzel Jaksch DSAP Dominant member
Rudolf Jung DNSAP Parliam Club Speaker
Josef Keibl DNP Parliam Club Speaker
Hans Knirsch DNSAP Dominant member
Hans Krebs DNSAP Dominant member
Franz Křepek BdL Leader
Ernst Kundt SdP Parliam Club Speaker
Rudolf Lodgmann DNP Dominant member
Felix Luschka DCSV Parliam Club Speaker
Robert Mayr-Harting DCSV Dominant member
Adolf Pohl DSAP Parliam Club Speaker
Ernst Schöllich DNP Parliam Club Speaker
Josef Seliger DSAP Leader
Franz Spina BdL Dominant member
Franz Windirsch BdL Parliam Club Speaker
Erwin Zajíček DCSV Dominant member
Table 1: Analyzed members of parliament
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Group Identity Economic Identity Economy
1 národ* zaměstnan* zaměstnanost
2 ras* dělník* zaměstnat
3 jazyk* dělnic* zaměstnal*
4 čech* proleta* zaměstná*
5 češi* proletář* mzd*
6 *češti* živnostn* mezd*
7 němec* kapitalist* clo
8 *němč* buržoaz cla
9 němc* rolnic* celní*
10 sudet* rolník* cel
11 menšin* cena
12 minorit* cen
13 naš* exist* cenov*
14 kriz*
15 finan*
16 důchod*
17 kapitalism*
18 kapitál*
19 hospodář*
20 výrob*
21 daň*
22 trh*
23 trž*
24 monopol*
Table 2: Czech Dictionaries
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 Czechoslovakia 
uncertain, all 
German parties 
seek irredenta 
Czechoslovakia 
recognized and viable. 
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Figure 2: Expectations of Ethnic Behavior
the beginning activists and negativists stood close in their frequency of referring to group
identifiers, this was significantly reduced after the activist parties entered government
in 1926, while the negativists retain significant and increasing focus on group identity.
The activists start reversing thier rhetoric around 1933, and particularly in 1935. By
1938 they are again approaching the negativists.
Figure 4 shows the share of words referring to the economy. It demonstrates that
activist members generally speak of the economy significantly more than negativists,
with an idiosyncratic exception of 1926. The difference between the activists and the
negativists increases in the early 1930s and peaks during the hardest depression years of
1931 and 1932. After 1936 the activist references to the economy start to decline, likely
as a reciprocal function of the rise of ethnic discourse demonstrated in figure 3.
The final two figures 5 and 6 consider the shares of group and economic identity refer-
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Figure 3: Share of mentions of group identity
ences of activists and negativists. The figures demonstrate that ethnic group identifiers
are significantly more used than economic identifiers, however, it underscores the above-
noted difference between the activists and the negativists. First, the activist share of
economic identifier references is stable around 0.2%. It declines only after 1935. The
negativist share of economic identifiers is significantly lower at an average of 0.14%.
Interestingly, the negativists do not seem to react to the Great Depression by increasing
their references to economic identity at all, while the activists record a peak in 1932.
Second, the negativists have consistently higher, and increasing shares of references to
ethnic group identity. On the contrary, activists, as expected, moderate their references
to group identity in the second half of the 1920s. As the impact of the Great Depression
peaks in 1931 and 1932, the activists speak about economic identify as much as about
ethnic identity. This trend is then reversed starting in 1933.
While activists start out as similar to negativists in their reference to group identity,
towards the late 1920s, and certainly by the time of the Great Depression, they turn
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Figure 4: Share of mentions of the economy
to refer to economic as much as to ethnic identity. Simultaneously, they increase their
references to the economy. This implies a growing focus on more practical, daily politics,
rather than on the question of Sudeten group status in Czechoslovakia. The reversal sets
in after 1933 as German Nazism comes to slowly redefine the position of the Sudeten
Germans in Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of Hitler’s ascendence to power. This
suggests that the activist turn away from ethnic politics and its subsequent u-turn are
largely a function of the circumstantial position of the German minority in the state.
The negativist camp is largely intransigent, despite its organizational change between
1933 and 1935. The negativists never moderate their extreme ethnic discourse which lies
at the center of their political struggle. They merely escalate their ethnic references after
1933. While initially electorally marginal, the negativists come to dominate the Sudeten
political scene after 1935, setting the Sudeten political tone to which the activists need
to respond.
The following analysis finally turns to the full corpus of all speeches by Sudeten Ger-
man representatives in the lower chamber of the four elected Czechoslovak Parliaments
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Figure 5: Activist mentions of group and economic identity
between the years 1920 and 1938. This corpus contains a total of 1332 speeches by
activists and 761 speeches by negativists. This analysis does not rely on any predefined
dictionary, but rather compares the lexical differences between activist and negativist
speeches over time by fitting a naive Bayesian model6. Logically, the more accurate
the model is in separating the differences between the two groups, the more distinct
they are. The simple expectation is that at the outset of the period, the two groups
should demonstrate lower distinction, but this distinction should increase over time as
the activists come to embrace cooperation within the Czechoslovak state, and join the
government. After the rise of Nazism in Germany, and the erosion of activist politics in
6This analysis aggregates speeches to five-year periods starting with 1920-25, moving up by one year.
Alternative time specifications lead to comparable results.
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Figure 7: Lexical differences between activists and negativists over time
Czechoslovakia, the distinction between the two groups should decline.
Figure 7 summarizes the results, supporting the general expectations. While at the
outset, the lexical differences between activist and negativist speech are moderate, they
increase significantly in the second half of the 1920s. Interestingly, there seems to be
a small reduction in this difference during the Great Depression years around 1929
and 1930, perhaps caused by increased discussion of economic topics, which made the
speeches of the two groups more similar. However, in the early 1930s the distinction
increases again, culminating around 1933. The following years see a notable decline in
speech differences, returning to the levels of the early 1920s7.
7Note that the increase in the size of the confidence intervals at the end of the time period is caused
by lower number of speeches, as the final years cannot aggregate over a five-year period – the year
1934 aggregates only the years 1934-38, the year 1935 aggregates only the years 1935-38 and so on.
32
This purely inductive analysis of lexical differences supports the findings based on the
simple identity dictionaries defined above. It demonstrates that activists and negativists
distinctively parted ways by the mid 1920s, where the prior came to cooperate with
the Czech majority, a cooperation that does not seem to have been hampered by the
social and economic devastation of the Great Depression. It was only the ascendance
of Nazism in Germany, and the subsequent electoral rise of the Sudetendeutsche Partei
as the carrier of negativism in Czechoslovakia, that started to pressure and eventually
erode the cooperative resolve of the activists.
Conclusion
This is not a story with a happy ending. After her dismemberment at Munich, the re-
maining areas of Czechoslovakia are neither economically viable, nor militarily defensible.
The betrayal by western allies cripples the credibility of the Czechoslovak government.
The remainder of the Czech lands is occupied by the Wehrmacht on March 15, 1939,
sending the government into exile in London, and putting members of SdP leadership
into prominent positions.
This paper suggests that the collapse of Czech-German collaboration which directly
enabled Czechoslovakia’s demise is crucially fuelled by the rise of Nazism in neighboring
Germany. The extent to which Nazi ideology turns towards extra-territorial Germans
and promises their inclusion in the new Reich, it undermines the position of the nu-
merous moderate Sudeten elites seeking constructive ethnic coexistence. Indeed, when
the Sudeten Germans accept – albeit reluctantly – their fate as ethnic minorities in
Czechoslovakia, their dominant representatives turn away from ethnic discourse, and
focus on productive work with and within the Czechoslovak government. This vital col-
laboration develops in the mid 1920s and continues well into the dark years of the Great
Depression. The economic disaster that befalls Czechoslovakia like other industrialized
countries in the early 1930s does not end Sudeten cooperation. On the contrary, Ludwig
Czech, as the Czechoslovak minister of social work, tirelessly works towards improving
the social situation, without regard for nationality or language. Only after 1933, when
Hitler takes power in Germany, and paradoxically as the economic situation starts to
stabilize, does ethnic collaboration between Czechs and Germans deteriorate. The elec-
toral breakthrough of the SdP in 1935, in the immediate aftermath of the first transfer of
extra-territorial Germans from Saarland to the Reich, shifts the internal power dynamic
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in the Sudeten German camp, putting the collaborative activists on the defensive. As
German Nazism grows in confidence and amplifies its calls for irredenta, the SdP esca-
lates its demands, and the activists struggle to find a tone that would be heard by their
co-ethnics. The Anschluss of Austria seals their fate.
This case exemplifies the circumstantial nature of ethnic preferences – a topic that is
overlooked by the literature on both political preference formation, and on ethnic poli-
tics. It shows that while Sudeten Germans preferred to not belong to the Czechoslovak
state, once this question was taken off the table by exogenous factors (peace conference,
treaty with Austria, the Locarno process), the dominant minority representatives turned
towards the search for ethnic group maintenance within the status quo. This leads to
two developments. First, the vast majority of Sudeten German voters consistently sup-
port those parties that presented moderate cooperative solutions. Second, these elites
seek inclusive policy changes, particularly in the areas of equitable access to native lan-
guage schooling, to civil service jobs, and to government tenders. It is of course difficult
to assess whether all of these ethnic requests are just, or whether they simply aim at
re-establishing the primacy of the ethnic minority. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests
that, despite the details of the political give and take, the primary aim of the moderate
ethnic elites is to make their group symbolically, as well as practically equal citizens and
co-owners of state they live in. This goal, that in today’s language may be labeled as
‘multicultural,’ is, however, not inherent to the the group, it is but an outcome of their
current minority status. As circumstances change, political preferences change with
them. As the possibility to escape from minority status becomes increasingly realistic,
the cooperative moderates lose political support to the ethnic extremists who seek to
redress ethnic grievances more radically – by ending the group’s minority status. The
moderates are torn between their original cooperative aims, and the radicalization of
their group, struggling to adapt to the new discourse.
This is not a story with a happy ending. However, it is not a happy ending either for the
Czechs, or for the Sudeten Germans. While Franz Spina, disillusioned with the failure of
activism, dies shortly before Munich, Ludwig Czech fatefully refuses to leave the country
and eventually perishes in a Nazi concentration camp during the war. Other Sudeten
activists emigrate to the west, some founding settlements as far as western Canada. The
SdP leadership joins the NSDAP and comes to serve the Führer through the atrocities
of the Third Reich. After German capitulation, most leaders of negativist parties are
captured, and those who do not commit suicide are executed. Between 1945 and 1946
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some three million Sudeten Germans are ‘transferred’ from Sudetenland to neighboring
Germany and Austria. This ends centuries of German presence in the Czech lands,
making today’s Czech Republic one of the most ethnically homogeneous societies in the
world. Nonetheless, within this story without a happy ending is a lesson that ethnic
collaboration is possible, and that it can be found even in less than auspicious places.
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